NEW CHRISTIAN

Nov. - Dec. 1959

KRUSHCHEV and CHRISTMAS

By Kenneth Leslie

YOU CAN'T WHITEWASH HIROSHIMA

By Louise Harding

WISE DELIRIUM

A Christmas Song

Scrape the fiddle and pound the drum,
this is the wise delirium . . .

Flight of seed and flame of sod,
every mother is Mother of God!

Touch the harp with a gentle hand,
babes and beasts will understand,

Riot of rain and life begun,
every cradle holds the Son !

K.L.

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KRUSHCHEV AND CHRISTMAS

Fascism came to Europe as a way to control labor, and it rode to power as a red-killer, a method of salvation from Communism.

Fascism involved the loss of democratic rights. Its extreme form, Nazism, involved the murder of 6 million Jews, many million Slavs, the destruction of cities and the waste of countryside in Russia and Europe.

Since the inauguration of the Cold War by Churchill and Truman, through the rise and fall of McCarthy, and right up until the arrival of Krushchev in Washington, the same fascist tendency has been developing in America. It never developed into a full-fledged fascist movement, but the tendency has been there.

Benjamin Ginsburg, in "Rededication to Freedom" pleads for a reversal of that tendency. He says that the Communist Menace was a myth.

Reinhold Niebuhr says in his introduction to the book that "the Communist conspiracy was more dangerous than the author assumes."

Don't downgrade the "conspiracy", the implication is, for that would be to downgrade the courage and brains of those who exposed it and fought it!

Of course there was Soviet espionage, just as there was American espionage. And there were individuals in America who helped the Russians just as there were individuals in Russia who helped the Americans. That did not mean that American Communists were spies or that Russian malcontents were spies. Espionage is an essential part of the structure of our anarchic world. It will remain so for the time being.

All great powers have spies in every country in the world. All the armies of the great powers have plans of attack upon all other armies. It is necessary to repeat these commonly-known facts in order to realize how the cold warriors have seized upon them as if they were great discoveries, as if to find a spy was to unearth a plot of aggression, as if espionage meant hostility.

If America has spies in Britain, if the War College has plans for seizing parts of the British Commonwealth or Empire under certain circumstances (as is quite probable) does this mean that America is hostile?

America has a gigantic spy and sabotage organization with an unlimited bank account on top of the usual spy arms of navy, army, airforce, etc. The Soviets have their spies and counter-spies throughout the world. This is part of the world-as-it-is, not the world -as-it-should-be. Our leaders take advantage of the idealism of our people and make believe they are horror-stricken by the commonplaces of mutual espionage. Fraudulently they build up the fears which become the fuel of the Cold War and its Defense Contracts on which they grow richer and richer. Big

Labor follows Big Business and Big Brass in collusion and betrayal.

Benjamin Ginsburg says the American people are sick. He puts it thus, "The whole fungous growth of abridgments of freedom . . . indicates a pathological condition in the American spirit." He says there have been a number of suicides, Abe Fuller, the UN General Counsel, the Canadian diplomat, Herbert Norman, and Raymond Kaplan of the Voice of America. "If we add to these tragedies the myriads of ruined careers—silent sacrifices to the Moloch of anti-Communist hysteria—and the social disaster of disrupted activities (in the field of science alone there has been enormous social damage), it can readily be seen that we are dealing with a total misery of no mean order."

But what is the nature of this misery? We are sick, so what is the disease? Ginsburg says "too many persons at all levels of society are caught up in personal economic concerns and too few are devoting any energy to public concerns . . . " Is this a roundabout way of saying that our boasted way of life is too greedy, too acquisitive? Too much concentrated on the individual?

Ginsburg is too polite. There is a malevolence raging in the body of our society, controlling our media of communication, so powerful, so rigid that it has placed the Gospel of Jesus out of bounds and has outlawed the New Testament Way. Let us talk a moment of that Way.

Remember that Saint Paul was Saul, before he was Saint Paul. Saint Paul, when he was known as Saul, helped to murder Saint Stephen. He was a fanatic persecutor of those of the Way, the Christians as they were afterward called.

Those of the Way lived a common life. They prayed a common prayer. They shared everything. They were one. They called themselves the body of Christ. They were communists and Saul hated them.

But Saint Stephen as he died launched an arrow into the eyes of Saul, the arrow of forgiveness, and it festered there until Saul, infected with this arrow, dreamed the dream of the Damascus Road, and became Saint Paul.

Yes, Saint Paul was first Saul and a strong hater of the Way before he became a strong lover of the Way. He was not brainwashed. His brain was washed from within. But the inner compulsion of the Way with its fierce loyalty to communism was so harsh that it destroyed Ananias and Sapphira.

This was the Way, the way of Christ, the way of life, the way of "our" and "we" and "us", not the way of the divided lonely self. This is the way of 650 million Chinese. They have chosen it and we have chosen its opposite. They serve it with their lives. We give it lip-service on Sunday for one uncomfortable hour, then deny it and betray it and crucify it.

It is the human way. Its yoke is easy and its burden is light. The hard part is *to choose it.* Once chosen it becomes a delight,

a thing of joy forever. The carriers of the Gospel are in Russia and the East. The wariors against the Gospel are here in the West. The East discards God with their mouths and worships Him with their hands and feet. We in the West worship Him with our mouths and discard Him with our hands and feet.

Krushchev came amongst us and incarnated the same spirit which was in the peace makers of the ages. He did not melt the Cold War but he broke the ice of the Cold War. The refrigerating machines have been put to work since he left to make the ice solid again. Life Magazine which should be called Death Magazine tried its damnedst to downgrade Krushchev's work, but through the television screen he walked straight into the hearts of too many Americans. His freedom, his ebullience, his confidence, impressed everybody. His friendliness captured Eisenhower; and if Eisenhower can hold out against pressure until his Russian visit next Spring the welcome of the Russian people to the man representing a peaceful America will be very terrific.

In the meantime it will be a race between the military-business drive to war and the popular drive, based on medical and scientific and cultural and sport exchanges, to peace.

It was God's grace to America that Krushchev came here with peace in his heart and on his lips. It was an early Christmas gift. May we receive it with grace and a very deep gratitude!

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

I look forward to each issue of the *New Christian* for your editorial and its articles. Your current editorial: "Protestantism Joins Anti Soviet Crusade" is challengingly interesting turning the light on the religious and social trends that create more ills than they cure. I wish for you an increasing circulation of your stated views and the *New Christian* in general.

Enclosed please find subscription and I wish it could be generous enough to more fittingly express my deep appreciation.

Reverend R. Ross-Shannon, Chesterton, Ind.

Dear K.L.,—I have just re-read your hard-hitting, illuminating and inspiring article "Protestantism Joins Roman Anti-Soviet Crusade." Such keen analysis and penetration brings one back to the essence of truth. I always feel like a cleansing of the cobwebs with a clearer vision has taken place, when I read your words.

J. H., Brooklyn, N. Y.

NO WHITEWASH ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI BOMBINGS POSSIBLE

By Louise Harding

On July 8, 1959, cautiously tucked away in the second section of SF Chronicle (p.18), among the short obituaries of ordinary folk, statistics of births, etc., appeared a single-col. notice of the death of Admiral Yarnell. The concluding paragraph ran:

"He termed the use of atomic bombs against Japan 'a diabolic act' and said 'the United States lost the moral leadership of the world when it dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when Japan was at that time a defeated nation and was suing for peace.' "

The honest statement of Adm. Yarnell did not pass unnoticed: in the so-called "Reader's Digest" of August, appeared a condensation from The American Weekly, of an article by novelist Pearl Buck, entitled "The Bomb—Did We Have to Drop it?" Her attempted apology is based on an interview with Dr. Arthur H. Compton—with reference to his "handsome face", his ability to look her straight in the face, etcetera. Said he:

" . . . tens of thousands of Americans were dying on the islands of the Pacific. The war had to be stopped and stopped abruptly. But we all hoped that we could avoid an atomic attack on Japan. There was the simple reason of Christian compassion."

Professor P.M.S. Blackett, in his "Fear, War and the Bomb" (p.129), mentions an article in Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1947, by Henry L. Stimson, Secy. of War in 1945, who says that President Truman relied for advice on the "Interim Committee" under Stimson's chairmanship: its scientific members, Vannever Bush, Karl T. Compton, and James B. Conant.

The Committee had a Scientific Panel: members—A. H. Compton, Fermi, Lawrence and Oppenheimer.

Stimson says that on June 1, after discussions with the Scientific Panel, the Interim Com. unanimously recommended:

"1.) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.

"2.) It should be used on a dual target—that is, a military installation of war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and (3) It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon. One member later changed his view and dissented from the recommendation."

In the valuable book by Professor Richard N. Current—now unfortunately out of print—entitled "Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft", it is stated that

"These recommendations accorded with the opinions of Stimson's military advisers, among whom General Marshall in particular stressed the 'shock value' of the new weapon."

Indeed, it gave the recipients of this "Christian compassion"—exercised by the same ones who showered down Napalm Bombs on the women and children, as well as men working in the fields, during the War on Korea—quite a shock: the intent was religiously carried out. Takejiro Nichioka, a newspaper publisher was present in Nagasaki on the day of disaster. Of the injured and dying he writes thus:

"There were scores of them, many in rags so that I could see they had been deeply burned all over their bodies. The skin was peeled in deep strips from their faces and legs, as if they had been deftly skinned with knives. The exposed flesh underneath was deep red, sometimes black.

"Some had no faces, literally just black ridges of charred flesh in which the nose, mouth and eyes could hardly be distinguished. They uttered queer, short, animal-like sounds, as if they were beyond screaming. One man, walking on charred stumps of legs, was carrying a dead body upside down. Its legs were burned black."

Yes, the people of Nagasaki were thoroughly shocked. Not so the people of USA, who for the most part, took the affair with the utmost placidity, many excusing the action by reference to Pearl Harbor—which, as the Professor shows beyond doubt, could have been avoided by the exercise of a little common sense on the part of civil as well as military officials, who had been fully warned through the breaking of the Japanese secret code.

A month before the first bomb was exploded in New Mexico, a committee of seven scientists, headed by Professor James Franck, produced a report which urged that a demonstration of the new weapon be made, as a warning to Japanese militarists, on some barren island. And that, if, *after such a demonstration*, "the sanction of the UN (and public opinion at home) having been obtained, then, if there was no surrender, the weapon might be used against Japan." A petition on these lines signed by sixty-four scientists associated with the Metallurgical Project was sent direct to President Truman. However, Professor Blackett goes on, "the advice and warning of Professor Franck's Committee were not heeded, and the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki without warning." Thirtyfive towns had been given a general warning that they were open to attack, but "Hiroshima and Nagasaki, chosen among other things for their dense population, were not among them."

Blackett, pg. 127; quoting the Washington correspondent of the London Times, Aug. 18, 1945:—

"The decision to use the new weapon was apparently taken quite recently and amounted to a reversal of previous policy. A correspondent in the Baltimore Sun, writing from an authority which seems unimpeachable, says that, until early in June, the President and military leaders were in agreement that this weapon should not be used, but a reversal of the High Command policy was made within the last sixty and, possibly the last thirty days."

—*The test at Alamogordo had been made July 16,* and Mch. 19, 1955, the SF News Editor remarked that "Gen. Groves had reported (top secret, of course) that the bomb would be ready by Aug. 1, 1945, and *it was so promising that a full-scale test would not be necessary.*" (Italics added).

Groves was in charge of the project: he meant that the bomb would be ready for general action.

But claims novelist Pearl Buck, "the bomb was an intricate device, still in the development stage: we could not afford a dud." And that, were previous notice given, Japanese air power could interfere—an idea which does not seem to have occured to the militarists until after Groves had called the Bomb a sure-fire thing.

From Professor Blackett's report, it can be seen how novelist Buck twists the facts when she wrote that Compton took a poll of 150 scientists and 87 percent voted for the military use of the atomic bomb if, after other means were used, there was still no surrender." This is a very sketchy way to treat the Franck Report and its general acceptance originally.

Another bland liar is ex-president Truman who, Dec. 16, 1946, wrote Compton that "The Japanese were given fair warning, and were offered the terms which they finally accepted, well in advance of the dropping of the bomb."

They were not warned of the nature of the Bomb; and they were not offered the terms which they finally accepted, as will be conclusively shown further along in this report.

In the Atlantic Monthly article by Compton, on which Truman was commenting, and in which Compton plies the whitewash brush, it is NOT mentioned that the Japanese were thoroughly beaten, out of gas and other supplies, and were making overtures to surrender on the terms U.S. finally offered them.

Truman Duplicity:

Blackett, 139—

"The motive behind the choice of targets remains obscure. President Truman stated on August 9, 1945: "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in the first instance to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians." On the other hand, in the official Bombing Survey Report we read: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as

targets because of their concentration of activities and population."

Blackett, 131: Compton and Stimson failed to mention the long-planned Russian campaign in Manchuria: Elliott Roosevelt wrote: in "As He Saw It", in the chapter on the Yalta Conference (Feb. 1945).

> "But before the (Yalta) Conference broke up, Stalin had once more given the assurance he had first volunteered in Teheran in 1943: that, within six months of VE day, the Soviets would have declared war on Japan; then, pausing in thought, he had revised that estimate from six months to three months.

"The European war," writes Blackett, ended on May 8, so the Soviet offensive was due to start on August 8, and did so start. This fact is not mentioned either by Mr. Stimson or Dr. Compton . . . The first atomic bomb was dropped on August 6 and the second on August 9. The Japanese accepted the Potsdam terms August 14.

The U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan on August 8, and their offensive started early on August 9. On Aug. 24, the Soviet High Command announced that the whole of Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, etc., had been captured and that the Japanese Manchurin army had surrendered. No doubt the capitulation of the home government on August 14 reduced the fighting spirit of the Japanese forces. If it had not taken place, the Soviet campaign might well have been more expensive; but it would have been equally decisive.

If the saving of American lives had been the main objective, surely the bombs would have been held back until (a) it was certain that the Japanese peace proposals made through Russia were not acceptable, and (b) the Russian offensive, which had for months been part of the Allied strategic plan, and which Americans had previously demanded, had run its course.

Further quoted is a broadcast made by Truman Aug. 9, in the course of which he said: "The Soviet Union, before she had been informed of our new weapon, agreed to enter the war in the Pacific. We gladly welcome into this struggle against the last of the Axis aggressors our gallant and victorious ally against the Nazis."

The Rosenbergs were executed on the alleged—never-proven ground that they tried to tell Russia!:

—What a way to treat an ally, who had put up the bulk of the forces and suffered by far the greatest number of fatalities—not to inform Russia (only Britain) about the successful testing of the Bomb! Admiral Zacharias tells how Stalin complained bitterly of this, (and he was fully justified in his attitude).

Did They Really Need Russia After All?

Professor Current Writes:

> Once the Russians should become, as expected, our active

allies in the Pacific, there could be little doubt of the inevitability of Japan's surrender, unconditional if need be. But Forrestal, for one, doubted whether the United States would benefit from achieving such a negative and destructive aim. On May 1, at another meeting of the three Secretaries, he raised several questions: "How far and how thoroughly do we want to beat Japan?" . . . What about Russian influence in the Far East. Do we desire a counterweight to that influence? And should it be China or should it be Japan?"

Current, (con.)

"Much concerned about Roosevelt's secret agreement with Stalin at Yalta, Grew, Acting Asst. Secy. of State on, May 12 raised questions similar to Forrestal's in a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of War. In the Yalta protocol Roosevelt had agreed that, as the price of Russian aid against Japan, Russia should resume the dominant position in the Far East she had held before the Russo-Japanese war. Now Grew asked Stimson whether the earliest possible entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific was of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude a reconsideration of the Yalta Agreement, and whether the Soviet Union should be granted a share in the postwar occupation of the Japanese home islands. Stimson replied that Russian entry would materially shorten the war and thus save American lives, that the Yalta concessions were within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S. military action short of war . . .

Weeks before listeners in Washington had learned, through the broken Japanese code, that the Japanese were anxious to get out of the war, the War Department's Operational Division had informed Stimson that

To enforce unconditional surrender within a reasonable time, would probably take not only an American landing in Japan, or at least the imminent threat of one, but also Russian participation in the Far Eastern war. In early 1945 most American military thinkers had shared this conviction that Russian aid was indispensible . . . In February, before the Yalta Conference, (Stimson) prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of state in which he argued against raising the question of Russian buffer states in Europe, or the question of American bases in the Pacific, until the Russians had 'clearly committed themselves' to fighting Japan."

Japan Ready to Surrender.

Current, cont.—

According to Captain Zacharias, an intelligence branch of the Navy Dept. designated as OP-16-W concluded that "by the end of June the plight of the Japanese had become desperate. Now, it was no longer a material consideration such

as the retention of Manchuria or Korea which prevented the Japanese Premier who had been installed to make peace from saying in so many words that he would accept our terms. The only doubt which still forestalled a decision was the future status of the Emperor."

"The (preceding) Japanese government could not cope with the worsening condition of Japan—the increasingly destructive American air raids, the progressive decline in stocks of aircraft, oil, steel, coal . . . "

"In July the emperor and the peace-minded members of the council made overtures to the Soviet government with a view to Russian mediation between Japan and the United States. They intended to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy with official instructions to seek terms short of unconditional surrender but with private instructions to agree to peace at any prce."

Stimson, Grew, Forrestal, and Truman, were considering possible peace terms. They had a sub-committee concentrating on Japan; its chairman was Eugene H. Dooman, "a career diplomat widely experienced in Far Eastern affairs.

"Early in the spring of 1945, Col. Dana Johnson, chief of psychological warfare in Hawaii, called in Dooman and Grew in Washington. Col. Johnson told them he had gathered, from his Interrogations of high-ranking war prisoners, that the Japanese were on the point of giving up but were held back by a fear that the imperial institution would be abolished and the emperor himself punished as a war crimnal."

Grew then instructed Dooman to draft an outline of policy. "Dooman's paper included a clause specifically stating that the Japanese people's choice of a postwar government "may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace."

Stimson approved, but General Marshall, "though approving the paper, warned that its early publication would be "premature'. So, it was laid aside for the time being.

Stimson got the news of the Alamogordo bomb explosion. on his arrival at Potsdam, for the Big Three conference. "On his arrival there he had been surprised to meet Americans who still thought of getting the Soviet Union to help defeat Japan. The news from New Mexico, he later recalled with satisfaction, convinced all of them that it was "pointless" to go on trying to hurry up the Russians."

Stimson had with him a copy of Dooman's State Department paper on the surrender terms: Churchill, Truman and Byrnes approved of it. "On July 26—just ten days after Alamogordo—it was promulgated from Potsdam to Japan and the world. The call in the draft for unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed

forces was retained, but there was no hint of the existence of the Bomb. *But something had been taken away—the clause making clear that the Japanese if they surrendered, could keep their emperor.*"

So, the Japanese did not surrender, and the US militarists had the chance to observe further the workings of the Bomb. Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki. "The emperor declared for peace, and then, on August 10, the full cabinet unanimously approved acceptance of the terms—*on condition that these did not change the emperor's prerogatives!*

"When the Japanese reply reached Washington, by way of the Swiss government, American policy makers faced the question of accepting the surrender with the string attached. Truman asked Stimson for his advice. Stimson said that 'even if the question hadn't been raised by the Japanese we would have to continue the Emperor ourselves in order to get into surrender the many scattered armies of the Japanese who would own no other authority.' *The Japanese counter terms were accepted.*"

The Forrestal Diaries, 11 May 1945:—

> Ambassador Harriman said he thought it was time to come to a conclusion about the necessity for the early entrance of Russia into the Japanese war. He said he was satisfied they were determined to come in because of their requirements in the Far East . . . He said that there could be no illusion about anything such as a "free China" once the Russians got in, that the two or three hundred millions in that country would march in when the Kremlin ordered.
>
> Vice Admiral Cooke said he thought the necessity for Russia's early participation was very much lessened as a result of a recent events, although the Army he didn't think shared that view.
>
> 15 July 1945 Messages today on Japanese-Russian conversations . . . .Throughout Sato's message ran a note of cold and realistic evaluation of Japan's position . . . The gist of his final message was that it was clear that Japan was thoroughly and completely defeated and that the only course open was quick and definite action recognizing such fact . . .
>
> It is significent that these conversations began before there could have been much effect from the thousand-plane raids of the Third Fleet and several days before the naval bombardment of Kamaishi.
>
> 28 July 1945—
>
> . . . Talked with Byrnes (now at Potsdam as American Secretary of State . . .) Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Once in there, he felt, it would not be easy to get them out . . .

Writes the editor of the Diaries Forrestal learned at a post-war luncheon where Eisenhower was present.. that: "When President

Truman came to Potsdam in the summer of 1945, he told Eisenhower he had as one of his primary objectives that of getting Russia into the Japanese war. Eisenhower begged him at that time not to assume that he had to give anything away to do this, that the Russians were desperately anxious to get into the Eastern war and that in Eisenhower's opinion there was no question but that Japan was already thoroughly beaten.

—From Eisenhower's "Crusade in Europe":—

P.428—"Stalin had told President Roosevelt at Yalta (January 1945) that within three months from the day of the German surrender the Red Army would join in the attack against Japan."

P.441-2—"Another item on which I ventured to advise President Truman involved the Soviets' intentions to enter the Japanese war. I told him that since reports indicated the imminence of Japan's collapse, I deprecated the Red Army's engaging in that war . . . It was my personal opinion that no power on earth could keep the Red Army out of the war unless victory came before they could get in."

Editor's Note to Forrestal Diaries, entry of June 8:—

According to a McCloy memo., "Stalin also intimated that he wanted a zone of occupation in Japan jointly with the United States."

Professor Current, p. 237:

" . . . the memoirs (of Stimson) did indeed hint that Russia and not Japan was the real target of the atom bomb. By the time of the Potsdam conference, the memoirs said, Stimson had come to the view that the bomb would 'give democratic doplomacy a badly needed 'equalizer' as against the postwar power of the Communist colossus."

Blackett, p.139:

"So we may conclude that the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress. The fact, however, that the realistic objectives in the field of *Macht-Politik*, so well achieved by the timing of the bomb, did not square with the advertised objectives of saving 'untold numbers' of American lives, produced an intense inner psychological conflict in the minds of many English and American people who knew, or suspected, some of the real facts."

Summary Report on the Pacific War, by U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 4:—

"... It seems clear that even without the atomic bomb attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion . . . Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that cer-

tainly prior to December 31, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropepd, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Blackett, 134, quotes Gen. Henry H. Arnold:

"The fact is that the Japanese could not have held out long because they had lost control of the air. They could offer effective opposition neither to air bombardment nor to our mining by air and so could not prevent the destruction of their cities and industries and the blockade of their shipping."

This answers the attempted point made by Compton to Pearl Buck that "if previous notice (of a demonstration of the Bomb) were given, Japanese air power could interfere."

Pearl Buck quoting Compton:

"He lifted questioning eyes. You understand? We had to compel the Japanese to surrender before the invasion in November. We knew they would surrender only under circumstances that they could consider honorable.

"What he said was true, because the Japanese are the proudest people on earth. They had never been defeated in war. To surrender was unthinkable, unless there was no escape."

This attempt to justify the Bombs is thoroughly dishonest. The evidence is indisputable that the Japanese were anxious to surrender, long before they knew about the contemplated bomb attacks. Compton is only trying to justify his own part in this hideous atrocity.

Novelists should stick to their lasts.

"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan," wrote Admiral William D. Leahy. "My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."

EDITORIAL NOTE

We believe no good purpose is served by such whitewashing of our great crimes and misdemeanors as is indulged in by the eminent novelist Pearl Buck and President Compton of Harvard, whose dishonesty and hypocrisy has been thoroughly documented and exposed by Louise Harding. It is the function of this magazine to tell the hounding hurting truth. For the road to greatness is not the road of gadgets and personal comfort. It is not even the road of survival. It is the bitter hard road of truth.

On the basis of our function we dare ask your continued support and a wider coverage. Merry Christmas to all!

NEW CHRISTIAN

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